

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05
H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01
SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 AID-05 COME-00 EB-08 FRB-03
TRSE-00 XMB-02 OPIC-03 LAB-04 SIL-01 OMB-01
AGRE-00 /106 W

-----127471 121117Z /23/72

R 110900Z JAN 78
FM AMEMBASSY SANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3496
INFO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY CAIRO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANA 182

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

E.O. 11652 XGDS-1
TAGS: PINT, PGOV, YE, YS, SA
SUBJECT: SITUATION IN PDRY

REFERENCE: TEHRAN 0251

BEGIN SUMMARY: WHILE THERE ARE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
SALIM AND ABD AL-FATTAH, DIFFERENCES WHICH OFFER
POSSIBILITY FOR EXPLOITATION, SO FAR BONDS BETWEEN THE
MEN HAVE PROVEN EQUAL TO THE STRAINS AND, MOREOVER,
SOVIETS HAVE OUTBID AND OUTMANEUVERED SAUDIS. END
SUMMARY.

1. THERE ARE RPT ARE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SALIM
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RUBAYI ALI AND ABD AL-FATTAH ISMAIL. SALIM IS FROM
THE SOUTH. ABD AL-FATTAH IS FROM THE NORTH.
SALIM IS IDENTIFIED WITH THE MILITARY AND THE
GOVERNMENT WHILE ABD AL-FATTAH IS IDENTIFIED
WITH SECURITY AND THE PARTY. ABD AL-FATTAH IS
A DOCTRINAIRE COMMUNIST WHOSE CONCERN FOR
IDEOLOGY IN EVERY AREA OF NATIONAL LIFE IS PRE-

DOMINANT.SALIM IS MUCH MORE CONCERNED WITH GETTING THINGS DONE ALTHOUGH HE IS ALSO A COMMITTED IDEOLOGICAL LEFTIST. ABD AL-FATTAH IS IDENTIFIED WITH THE POLICY OF EXPLOITING THE REVOLUTION TO OMAN, THE GULF, NORTH YEMEN AND THE REST OF THE PENINSULA, WHILE SALIM IS MORE CONCERNED WITH INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT.

2. ON THE OTHER HAND, EACH SEEMS TO FEEL STRONGLY THAT HE NEEDS THE OTHER IN ORDER TO SURVIVE. BOTH HAVE BEEN UNITED IN THE PAST BY A COMMON VIEW OF THE OUTSIDE ENEMY, "REACTIONARIES" WHO AT TIMES HAVE MADE WAR ON THE SOUTH. BOTH HAVE BEEN UNITED IN THE PAST BY THE NEED TO CRUSH THE INTERNAL ENEMY, WHICH IS DEFINED AS THE OLD RULING CLASS AND ITS TRADITIONALIST SUPPORT. FINALLY, BOTH ARE TERRORISTS WHO ARE UNITED BY THE MEMORIES OF THE SUCCESSFUL REVOLT AGAINST BOURGEOIS NATIONALISTS ON ONE HAND, AND THE BRITISH ON THE OTHER. THEIR DAYS OF CLANDESTINE ACTIVITY CREATE A KIND OF FRATERNITY.

3. SAUDIS DEvised A VERY CLEVER POLICY TO SPLIT THESE MEN BY OFFERING MONEY TO ALLOW IMPORTS FOR FOOD AND CLOTH. NEW CONTRACTS WOULD CREATE A WESTERN PRESENCE AND INVIGORATE THE MORIBUND ECONOMY. POLITICALLY, IT MEANT CONFIRMING THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT

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INTERNALLY IN EXCHANGE ONLY FOR A DIFFERENT FOREIGN POLICY. SAUDIS SOUGHT TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN INTERNATIONALIST ABD AL-FATTAH AND NATIONALIST SALIM. POLICY MIGHT HAVE WORKED, IN OUR VIEW, BUT SOVIETS SEEM ACTUALLY TO HAVE OUTBID THE SAUDIS IN THIS CASE BY OFFERING NEW MILITARY EQUIPMENT IF SOUTH YEMENIS SENT THEIR OLD TO ETHIOPIA. SOUTH YEMEN'S REJECTED SAUDI MILITARY AID OFFER AS UNTRUSTWORTHY. SOVIETS ALSO APPARENTLY OFFERED NEW ECONOMIC AID, ALTHOUGH WE DOUBT IT WAS AS MUCH AS SAUDIS WERE OFFERING. SAUDIS, HOWEVER, OVERREACHED THEMSELVES BY GOING BEYOND QUESTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY AND SUGGESTING CHANGES IN INTERNAL POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS. THEY ASKED SALIM, FOR INSTANCE, TO SACK ABD AL-FATTAH ISMAIL.

4 CONSENSUS AMONG INFORMED OBSERVERS IN YEMEN IS THAT SALIM COULD SACK ABD AL-FATTAH ANY TIME HE WANTS. HE IS SUFFICIENTLY POPULAR AND SUFFICIENTLY STRONG TO DO SO. HE DOESN'T DO SO BECAUSE HE DOESN'T WANT TO. OC-LIKE SALIM CONTINUES TO WANT TO BE UOKED WITH ABD AL-FATTAH, THE ASS, UNTIL HE IS

SURE HE CAN AND WANTS TO PULL THE WHOLE LOAD HIM-SELF. HE WILL PROBABLY NOT FIGHT ABD AL-FATTAH ON MATTERS OF IDEOLOGY OR EVEN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY, BUT IF ABD AL-FATTAH REACHES FOR CERTAIN POSITIONS, OR EXTENDS POWERS OF PARTY AND SECURITY TOO FAR, ALIM MIGHT MOVE AGAINST HIM.

5. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SALIM AND ABD AL-FATTAH, THEREFORE, ARE NOT MATTER OF CLEVER ACTING IN OUR VIEW, VUT REAL DIFFERENCES WHICH, AT SOME TIME, MAY GIVE SAUDIS THE OPENING THEY NEED TO INTRODUCE THEMSELVES AND THEIR FREINDS AS BALANCE TO SOVIETS AND RADICAL CLIENTS IN PDRY. SAUDIS NOT HELPING WITH SHARURAH BUILDUP WHICH STRENGTHENS ALL THAT ISMAIL HAS BEEN
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SPOUTING ABOUT REACTIONARY THREATS.

6. SOVIETS, HOWEVER, ARE NOT GOING TO LET DETESTED SAUDIS PUSH THEM OUT OF ADEN EASILY. SOVIETS ARE TOUGH, RICH, EXPERIENCED AND DEEPLY ENTRENCHED. IF SALIM WERE ABLE TO DUMP ISMAIL, HE WOULD HAVE TOUGH TIME MODERATING BECAUSE OF ENTRENCHED SOVIET PRESENCE WHICH APPEARS BE DEEPENING. SOVIET SUPPORT TENDS TO STRENGTHEN ISMAIL HAND, ESPECIALLY BY ROLE OF SURROGATES, I.E. EAST GERMANS IN SECURITY SERVICES AND CUBANS IN MILITIA (BOTH ISMAIL PROVINCES). CUBANS ALSO INVOLVED IN AGRICULTURE.
SCOTES

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL STABILITY, BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS, POLITICAL LEADERS, POLITICAL SITUATION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 11 jan 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978SANA00182
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780025-0129, D780017-0167
Format: TEL
From: SANA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780176/aaaacyi.tel
Line Count: 149
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: b48ceae4-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 TEHRAN 251
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 28 mar 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3793364
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SITUATION IN PDRY
TAGS: PINT, PGOV, YE, YS, SA
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/b48ceae4-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014